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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

HONORARY TRUST IN PENNSYLVANIA
The honorary trust lacks a definite beneficiary, and therefore has long
presented a problem of some difficulty. When the purposes of a trust are
charitable, lack of a definite beneficiary is an objection of small merit compared
with the fact that the public generally is being benefitted. When, however,
the purposes are purely private ones, there being no public policy demanding
that such trusts be upheld, the courts have been much less solicitous for their
survival. The primary objection to such trusts is the absence of a person who
may sue to enforce them. Bogert, in his work on trusts, has summed up the
objections of the courts in these words:
"The trust has for centuries been developed with the fundamental
conception that there must be a competent ascertainable cestui to
compel its enforcement in the case of private trusts. The proposal
for honorary trusts is an attempt to alter one of the basic ideas of
the trust. Such an alteration would mar the trust as an institution and
confuse courts and lawyers as to its characteristics." 1
The attempt by a testator to create a trust for the purpose of feeding his
dogs, 2 to keep his grave in repair,3 or to have masses said for him, 4 would have
no effect, other than to create a resulting trust for the settlor's heirs and next
of kin in the property attempted to be settled in the honorary trust, if the argument of Bogert and those courts which suscribe to his theory is followed without qualification. Here, they say, is a perfect example of a trust which should
not be permitted to exist since there is nobody who may enforce it. But, as
other authorities have pointed out, this is not a particularly appealing objection.
Bogert, in extending his argument against this type of trust says:
"If a donor desires to employ the trust to accomplish his purpose,
he should accept the fixed limitations of the trust institution and
mould his gift to meet those limitations. If he does not wish to
accept those limitations, he should bring about the desired end by
using a power, a defeasible interest, a condition, or in some other
way."'
In an attempt to support these trusts Scott says:
"The testator could have accomplished the desired result by giving
a power to appoint for the desired purpose; he could have accomiBogert, Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 166.
21n Re Dean, 41 Ch. Div. 552; Willett v. Willett, 197 Ky. 663, 247 S.W. 739.
$Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56; 46 A. 278.
4
Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church of Mobile, 104 Ala. 327, 18 So. 314.
5Note 1, supra.
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plished nearly the same result by making a bequest conditional upon
the fulfillment of the desired purpose. There seems to be no reason, therefore, why attempted trusts for these purposes should be
regarded as against public policy ...One is always inclined to
doubt the soundness of an argument that a disposition is against
public policy when the same result accomplished in a different way
is not against public policy. If they fail, it is because of a purely
technical rule which defeats the intention of the testator." 6
The chief argument of the champions of the trust is based upon their conception of the obligation of the trustee as an optional one. They point oul
that the trustee cannot be compelled to carry out the terms of the trust since
there is no one to demand that of him. But, they say, why can not the trustee
carry out the trust if he is willing to do so? As Dean Ames has said:
"The only objection that has ever been urged against such a gift
is that the court cannot compel A (the trustee) to act if he is unwilling. Is it not a monstrous nonsequitur to say that therefore the
court will not permit him to act when he is willing?" 7
No policy of the law will be violated by thus allowing the intention of the
testator to be given effect. No one will be affected by this recognition of a
moral obligation by the trustee, except possibly the heirs, or next of kin of the
donor, and their objection cannot be based upon any defect in the trust itself,
but rather upon their desire that the money revert to themselves. A motive
of this sort should not recommend them to any special coasideration: viewed
as merely an honorary or imperfect obligation, the objection of lack of a proper
party to enforce the trust seems to be a groundless complaint. If the duty is no
more than an optional one, there can never be any question of enforcement.
Should the trustee choose to exercise his privilege not to carry out the trust,
there can arise no question of enforcement since there is no beneficiary to suffer
by or complain of the trustee's decision. In such a case the property reverts to
the heirs and next of kin of the donor or testator. If the trustee decides to
perform the trust as directed, there is again no question of enforcement, since the
trust is being carried out as desired by the settlor. It is in this latter situation
that the question comes before the courts. When the trustee attempts to carry
out the terms of the trust, the heirs or next of kin complain to a court of equity,
asserting that he holds for them on a resulting trust. In some jurisdictions there
is presented the anomalous spectacle of a court of equity suspending the performance of an honorary trust because there is no competent cestui to compel
6Scott, Control of Property by the Dead, 65 U. of Pa. Law Review 527, at 540.
7

Ames, The Failure of the Tilden Trust, 5 Harvard Law Review 389.
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its performance. Thus when the trust needs no enforcement the courts declare
it invalid because it cannot be enforced.
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts has adopted an attitude toward
these trusts which would receive perhaps the approval of the authorities on each
side of this controversy. Section 124 states:
"Where the owner of property transfers it upon an intended trust
for a specific non-charitable purpose, and there is no definite or
definitely ascertainable beneficiary designated, no trust is created;
but the transferee has power to apply the property to the designated
purpose, unless he is authorized by the terms of the intended trust
so to apply the property beyond the period of the rule against
perpetuities, or the purpose is capricious."
In comment (c) of the same section it is said:
"Since an intended trust for a specific non-charitable purpose is not
enforceable because there is no beneficiary to enforce it, it is not
a trust, as the term is used in the Restatement of this Subject.
Where the transferee has power to apply the property for such a
purpose, the intended trust is sometimes called an 'honorary trust'.
Since, however, the transferree has only a power and not a duty to
apply the property, and since in the Restatement of this Subject the
term 'trust' connotes the existence of duties which will be enforced
in the courts, it is more accurate to state that the trustee has a power
than it is to state that he holds upon trust, whether honorary or
otherwise."
Here a middle ground is taken which should satisfy the authorities on both
sides of the question. Though the words used are words of trust the Restatement
asserts that the resulting legal relation canot be termed a trust, (since they concede that there can be no such thing as a trust without a cestui), but performance
of the prescribed acts by the "trustee" should be approved by the courts, on the
ground that the "trustee" is vested with a power to dispose of the property in the
way stipulated, and may do so if he wishes.
Whatever the differences of opinion among the authorities, the Pennsylvania
law, on at least some phases of the subject, is now settled. The situations most
frequently considered involve attempts to create a trust for the erection of a monument or upkeep of a grave, or for the saying of masses for the soul of the
trustor or others. A very early case in which this question arose was Bainbridge.f'
Appeal.8 There the testator directed that his estate be converted into cash and
after performing certain other duties the 'executor was to use the residue in the
897 Pa. 483.
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erection of a monument at the testator's grave. The excecutor elected to perform
this duty, and the court refused to interfere with him -even though the heirs of
the deceased claimed that only a "reasonable" amount of the residue of the estate
should be expended in the erection of the monument. Here the doctrine or honorary trusts seems to receive definite recognition, though not by that name.
In the Bainbridges case the money was to be used immediately in fulfilling
the obligation and therefore there was no need to discuss the rule regarding the
duration of the trust. From the time of In Re Dean9 it has been settled that
such trusts as these cannot last beyond the period of a life and lives and twentyone years thereafter. In that case and in subsequent cases dealing with this
question of duration, it has been held by the courts that trusts of this type which
may extend beyond the above period are in violation of the rule against perpetuities. This is not entirely accurate. The rule against perpetuities is directed
against the remote vesting of future contingent interests only, and has no reference to the duration of estates. 10 The rule as set out in the Dean case is applied to the duration of the interest and therefore the rule against perpetuities
is not properly applicable. But it has been argued, with some force, that the
reason for the rule applies to honorary trusts and therefore the courts are correct
in speaking of the rule against perpetuities in connection with them, though
they may not be technically accurate.The contention is that the rule applying
to these trusts is at least an analogous rule. When such a settlement is made
the beneficial interest does not vest in a cestui since there is none, and it does
not vest in the trustee, since that is contrary to the intention of the donor, and
therefore the beneficial interest must vest in the heirs subject to the honorary
trust.' 2 If then, this beneficial interest vests in the heirs by means of a resulting
trust they have a vested interest subject to the performance of the honorary
trust. Their vested interest istherefore of a diminished marketability. The
reason for the rule against perpetuities is that future contingent estates have an
unfavorable effect upon the marketability of present interests. A glance at the
honorary trust situation shows that the resulting use in the heirs is diminished
in marketability because of the overhanging power of the trustee to carry out
the trust. Therefore this "outstanding power may be as objectionable to the
9

Note 2, supra. In that case the bequest was "for the term of fifty years, commencing
from my death, if any of the said horses and hounds shall so long live." It is interesting to
note that, though the animals concerned were hardly likely to live longer than twenty-one years
after the death of the trustees, the bequest is not drawn so as to certainly come to an end
within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter. Thus the court lays down the
rule for duration in one breath, and in the next seems to disregard it, holding the bequest valid
though it is conceivable that one or more of the horses and dogs might live beyond this period.
19johnson's Estate, 185 Pa. 179.
niSmith, Honorary Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 30 Columbia Law Review 60
2
1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 165.
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The duration rule applied
rule as a springing use of an executory devise.''"
to these trusts is not, then, a purely arbitrary limitation imposed upon them, but
is based upon reason and logic.
The Pennsylvania legislature early realized that a common form of such
trust, namely, the trust for the maintenance or erection of monuments and tombstones, might often be invalidated because in violation of the duration rule.
Therefore there was enacted in 1891 the following statute:
"No disposition of property hereafter made for the maintenance
or care of any cemetery, churchyard or other place for the burial of
the dead, or of any portion thereof, or grave therein, or monuments
or other erections on or about the same, shall fail by reason of
but said disposition
such disposition having been made in perpetuity,
14
shall be held to be made for charitable use."'
As Bainbridges' Appeal" indicates, this statute was not needed to validate such
trusts. Its only purpose was to remove a possible objection to these trusts on the
ground that they might endure for too long a period. In one of the first cases
decided under the statute of 1891, the court, in discussing a bequest for the
purpose of erecting a monumental memorial to the testator, said:
"*...
Testator was disposing of his own property. This is a
right assured to him by law, and restrained only by those enactments and principles of public policy which, for the good order
and welfare of society, have been established by the legislature or
the courts. Gifts for the erection of monuments and construction
of vaults or tombs in cemetery lots, and inclosing the same, and
providing for their future care and adornment, together with other
similar mortuary gifts, have ever been recognized, and the wishes
of the donor or testator carried out by the courts. And to remove
all doubts upon the subject, the legislature, by the Act of May 26,
1891, P. L. 119, expressly declared .... .. 16
A more certain indication that the Pennsylvania courts recognize these trusts
as valid apart from the statute could not be desired.
It is interesting to note that though the Act of 1891 was meant to prevent
the destruction of these trusts because of too long a duration, the courts still
reserve to themselves the right to invalidate them for perpetuity if the occasion
demands. Thus in Palethorp'sEstate,17 the testator left a sum the income from
13Note 11, supra.
141891, May 26, P.L. 119, Sec. 1.
15Note 8, supra.
16Smith's Estate, 181 Pa. 109.
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which was to be used for the care and maintenance of the family lot, and the
renewal of stones, etc., when necessary, and "for the support and maintenance
of some proper person to be from time to time selected and employed by my
trustees to attend to the care and oversight of said lot and show people where
it is." The court objected to the latter part of the gift on the ground that it
would create a "perpetual barker." It was held that this was not one of the
purposes contemplated by the act of 1891 and that therefore the gift, as to this
provision, was void as creating a perpetuity. Two conclusions may be drawn
from this case. First, the act is not mandatory but merely gives the courts the
right to uphold trusts of this nature even though they may continue beyond a
life and lives and twenty-one years thereafter, if the bequest is otherwise satisfactory to the court. Second, the court infers that it would have recognized
the invalidated part of the gift had it not provided for a perpetuity not within
the immunity created by the act of 1891. Is it not reasonable to suppose, from
this, that the Pennsylvania courts will recognize "honorary" obligations to be
performed within the proper period, even though they are not validated by the
act of 1891?
It is to be noted that the act of 1891 declares at its end that "said disposition shall be held to be made for charitable use." There was no necessity
that the legislature add this provision to the statute. They might have declared
that these dispositions were to be valid though to extend in perpetuity, and no
more. But they added that the disposition was to be held to be made for a
charitable use. Naturally the question arises as to whether it is a charitable use
within the meaning of Section 6 of the act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, requiring
that a will containing a gift to charity be made at least thirty days before the
death of the testator. Several early decisions in the lower courts held that Section
6 of the above act did apply,"8 and that therefore such bequests would be
void unless the will was made at least thirty days before the death of the testator.
In 1930 the Superior Court expressed a contrary opinion. A case came before
19
The court
the court in which a bequest for these purposes was involved.
decided that the trust was not within the familiar definition of a charitable use
as "anything that tends to promote the well doing and well-being of social man
where neither law nor public policy forbids." They argued that the act of 1891
was not meant to declare these trusts as charitable for any other purpose than
to preserve them from destruction as perpetuities. In support of their argument
they point to the enacting clause preceding the statute which clause is in the
words, "Legalizing Dispositions in Perpetuity for the Care of Burial Places."
Considering this the court says:
17249 Pa. 389.
18Boyd's Estate, 5 D. & C. 359; Eby's Estate, 30 D.R. 338.
19 Estate of Anna M. Deaner, 98 Pa. Superior Ct. 360.
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"The reference to charitable use at the end of the statute is limited
by the general enacting clause preceding and merely declares the
character of the immunity from the effect of the perpetuity doctrine,
which it was intended to confer on private trusts theretofore considered perpetuities."
In support for their argument the court pointed to Palethorp's Estate,2o in
which the court suggested a reduction of the fund for caring for the burial
lots from $150,000 to $10,000, the remainder to be diverted to the next of kin.
This could not have been done had the trust been charitable for all purposes.
Rather, it would have been necessary to award the residue for administration
cy pres. This decision has definitely removed such bequests from the operation
of Section 6 of the Act of 1917, P.L. 403. As the court observed the reason
for that law does not apply in cases of bequests for the maintenance of burial
lots. The law was meant "to make it reasonably certain that the thing done was
the free will act of the donor, and was not the result of undue solicitation on
the part of interested persons." 21 When the settlement is for the purpose of
maintaining the burial lot of the testator or his family, it is obviously free from
'undue solicitation."
In regard to trusts for the saying of masses the courts of Pennsylvania
early committed themselves to the view that such trusts might be upheld as religious trusts. The earliest case reported on the subject,22 concerned a will in
which the testator -expressed himself as follows, "I also give and bequeath the
sum of $1000, which my executors shall pay to the pastor at Newry, Blair Co.,
for masses for the repose of my soul, and for the repose of the souls of my
relatives and the repose of the souls of the faithful. of my parish." It was
held that this was a religious or charitable trust for the purpose specified, the
duty to carry out the same resting on the pastor of the church at the time of
the testator's death. In keeping with this decision it was decided in Rhymer's
Appeal,2 3 that a residuary bequest for the purpose of saying masses for the soul
of the testator was a religious use and therefore void under the act of 1855,24
because executed within thirty days of the testator's death. 25 It would follow
from these cases that a trust for the saying of masses is immune from the duration rule, since it is a charitable or religious use within the meaning of the act
or 1855, which provides that such trusts shall not be void because of being
26
limited in perpetuity.
20Note 17, supra.
2
iKessler's Estate, 221 Pa. 314, 321.
22
Appeal of Seibert and Bradley, Executors, 18 W. N. C. 276.
2393 Pa. 142.
241855, P.L. 328, reenacted in Sec. 6 of the Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403.
25
See also O'Donnell's Estate, 209 Pa. 63.
261855, April 26, P.L. 328, Sec. 10; 1895, May 23, P.L. 114, Section 1.
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There has been no case in Pennsylvania comparable to the celebrated case
of In Re Dean,27 which decided that a trust for the purpose of caring for certain old pets of the testator should be upheld so long as it was not in violation
of the duration rule. So far as is known this case has been followed in the
United States only once. In the single reported case,28 there was a bequest for
the support of a favorite dog of the testatrix which the court upheld as a trust
for a humanitarian purpose under a statute. The one case in Pennsylvania involving a trust for the upkeep of a specified animal leaves the reader with no
opinion as to the Pennsylvania view on this subject. In that case 2 9 it was held
that a bequest for the purpose of keeping certain burial lots in order, paying
any debts and funeral expenses of the deceased, and in caring for an old horse
"Bob," creates a trust for those purposes. However, the statements in the cases
concerning the care of burial lots, would not be in opposition to a prophecy
that such trust dispositions will be upheld in Pennsylvania, as and when the
question arises. Nowhere have the Pennsylvania courts shown that distinct
aversion to the trust without a cestui which distinguishes the criticism of the
opponents of the "honorary trust" doctrine. Rather, it might be said, they have
shown a definitely sympathetic attitude. Thus in Dulle's Estate,30 the court said
relative to a trust before them,
"The fundamental law of Pennsylvania in regard to property .. .
is that the owner may do as he pleases with it provided that the
disposition be not to unlawful purposes, and what he may do himself
he may do by agent while living, or by executor after death."
With this statement before us we may justly be surprised if the Pennsylvania
courts fail to follow the doctrine of In Re Dean.3 '
The reader is cautioned that the above discussion applies only to 'trusts
created for a specific purpose. Where the purpose designated by the testator
32
is an indefinite one it is generally agreed that the trust cannot be upheld.
David C. Wolfe
27Note
2

2,

supra.

SWillett v. Willett, Note 2, supra.
29Wrenshall's Estate, 72 Pa. Superior Ct. 258.
30218 Pa. 162.
81Note 2, supra.
2
8 Morice v. Bishop of U. of Durham, 10 Ves. 521; Scott, Control of Property by the
Dead, 65 Pa. Law Review 527, at 538-39; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 166.

